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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, many papers and reports were published on the
analysis of Stuxnet’s code, [1], [2]. No quantitative analy-
sis of Stuxnet was done yet, mostly because the necessary
information is not readily available. However, quantitative
analysis can be very useful, for example to obtain better
insight in the spreading process and to analyze the efficiency
of counter-measures. Quantitative analysis of some other com-
puter viruses was recently done in [3], [4].
The questions we address in the present paper is to what
extent quantitative analysis of Stuxnet is feasible and what is
necessary to increase its precision.
II. STUXNET BASICS
Stuxnet is known as one of the most complex computer
viruses that was primarily written to target Industrial Control
Systems (ICSs). It was first discovered in July 2010, however
Stuxnet was operating without being noticed for at least one
year prior to its detection. The virus uses both known and
unknown Windows vulnerabilities to install and propagate.
During the propagation phase, Stuxnet behaves similarly to
known worms and botnets. Once it reaches its target, it
sabotages the system by reprogramming Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs), which can lead to a disaster.
Stuxnet’s behavior consists of three phases: spreading,
obtaining access to the PLC, and sabotage. In the present
paper, we only address the spreading phase. Modeling of
the attacking and sabotaging phases is not of interest, since
once the target is reached, Stuxnet accomplished its mission.
Stuxnet has the ability to propagate using many methods.
We classify them for further discussion as follows (see Table
1): propagation (i) via USB flash drives and other removable
media, (ii) via network, (iii) via shared folders.
Copying itself to removable drives is the main method
of propagation, since ICSs are usually programmed through
computers that are not connected to a network. Operators
use removable drives to exchange data, and once the infected
removable drive is inserted into a new computer, Stuxnet will
copy itself and its supporting files. The compromised computer
can infect new USB drives afterwards.
Propagation via network can be seen as a botnet or worm
spread which have been recently studied and modeled, as
mentioned above, [3], [4]. Note that network propagation is
the only fully automatic way of spreading.
The third way of propagation includes infection via shared
folders or network drives, and print spooler services. For
example, Stuxnet will execute on each computer where a
compromised folder is used.
Local Remote
Manual Removable drives Shared folder
Automatic N.A. Network
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPAGATION MECHANISMS
Stuxnet spreads mainly within company networks. However,
propagation between networks of different companies is pos-
sible if, for example, the compromised computer has VPN
connection to an outside network, or an infected USB stick is
taken to the outside network (and used there).
The behavior of Stuxnet is controlled remotely. After instal-
lation, the virus contacts a command and control (C&C) server
and sends information about the compromised computer. The
C&C servers are mostly used for spreading new versions of the
virus. However, the ability to receive information from outside
can be used by attackers to help the worm propagate through
specific target networks or, alternatively, stop propagation.
III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SPREADING PHASE
This section addresses the main research question: Is quanti-
tative analysis of the Stuxnet’s spreading phase possible? Out
of many approaches, in this paper we select the mean-field
approach [5] since it has been shown to work efficiently and
to provide fast and accurate results in similar cases [6]. The
main idea of the mean-field method is to model the overall
behavior of a large system via the average behavior of a single
node.
Each component of the system can be modeled as a
continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC). Using the published
information about Stuxnet, an individual CTMC model for
all relevant system components can be built, i.e., a single
computer, a USB stick and a shared folder (see Figure 1a)).
(Note that further interaction with the security community may
well lead to a refinement of this model.) Some of the transition
rates are constant (e.g., removal rates (RR)), other rates depend
on the states of the other CTMCs (e.g., the infection rate).
Using the mean-field method the propagation model can then
be built by lumping the individual CTMCs and constructing
the overall CTMC for the different components. For example,
the lower part of Figure 1b) depicts the accumulated mean-
field model for all USB drives. The accumulated model
of a single company network is obtained by combining all
individual computers and all shared folders, describing the
interaction of all the nodes within one company network. This
is represented by a cloud in Figure 1b). The overall model then
combines all company networks and takes into consideration
the interaction between them (represented by rate pij) and the
influence of the USB sticks (represented by rate UUSB). Note
that now some rates depend on the state of all the model (e.g.,
rate of infection is proportional to the number of infected USB
sticks, active infected computers, and infected shared folders).
While the presented example only consists of three companies
it is clearly possible to extend the model to more companies
or even to model companies in different countries.
Once the final model is built, differential equations can be
derived and solved to analyze the propagation of Stuxnet.
IV. DISCUSSION
For a model as developed in the previous section to be
useful, values for many model parameters (such as infection
rates) are needed. Unfortunately this is not trivial.
The automatic spreading via the network is probably the
easiest to parameterize, since it does not involve humans.
One could obtain values for these parameters analyzing the
Stuxnet code, or possibly easier, by doing measurements on
life infected computers. This is not trivial for several reasons:
(i) it needs either a sufficiently large testbed, or a real target
environment; (ii) accurate measurements may take a long time
since Stuxnet does not tend to spread very quickly; (iii) results
may be inaccurate due to the “synthetic” environment.
Aspects that involve humans are harder to parameterize;
in the case of Stuxnet, this includes the propagation via
shared folders and removable USB drives, and the influence
of the C&C server. For some of these parameters, reasonable
estimates may be made, e.g., from sociological studies. The
C&C server is not included in the model. Instead, it is expected
that whenever the attackers modify the virus via the C&C
system, this effectively changes the parameters (and thus the
behaviour) of the virus. Presumably, this does not follow a
specific pattern (otherwise it could have been coded into the
virus itself), so modelling this is impossible.
However, all is not bleak. Even without complete knowl-
edge of the parameter values, and without knowledge of
the influence of the C&C, potentially interesting results may
be obtained. For example, by trying different values for the
unknown parameters, the sensitivity of the final results to
them can be ascertained, and possibly upper and lower bounds
obtained. Furthermore, by comparing results from the model
to data about Stuxnet’s real spreading pattern in the past,
parameters can be tuned, and the actual influence of the C&C
server judged.
In conclusion, we find that a mean-field model of most
aspects of Stuxnet spreading could be feasible, but that
parametrization is hard. This calls for a close collaboration
between security and modeling experts, with interaction and
benefit going both ways.
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Fig. 1. a) Individual CTMs for computer, shared folder and USB stick;
b) The overal model of Stuxnet propagation.
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